Adversarial Causal Intervention Falsification
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Computer Science > Machine Learning
Title:Adversarial Causal Intervention Falsification
Abstract:Generative models can reproduce an observational distribution while encoding an incorrect causal structure. We study a sequential game in which a structural causal generator proposes observational and interventional distributions, while an adversarial experimentalist selects interventions intended to maximally falsify the generator. The discriminator is therefore not merely a real-versus-synthetic classifier: it is indexed by an intervention and tests whether the generator reproduces the corresponding post-intervention law. We introduce Adversarial Causal Intervention Falsification (ACIF), formulate oracle and implementable versions of the game, and distinguish three objects that are often conflated: observational fit, interventional equivalence over an admissible query class, and point identification of a structural causal model. For finite model and intervention classes, we prove: (i) an exact reduction of the adversarial objective to a worst-intervention integral probability metric; (ii) identification up to interventional equivalence, with point identification under a separating intervention family; (iii) existence of mixed-strategy equilibria; (iv) finite-sample uniform convergence and margin-based model-selection guarantees; and (v) a logarithmic elimination guarantee for a disagreement-driven sequential design under a balanced-separation condition. We also give a complete linear-Gaussian example in which two observationally indistinguishable causal directions are separated by a single well-chosen intervention. The framework clarifies what an adversarial causal discriminator can and cannot certify, and provides a principled bridge between causal generative modeling, active causal discovery, and experimental design.
| Subjects: | Machine Learning (cs.LG); Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT); Econometrics (econ.EM); Methodology (stat.ME) |
| Cite as: | arXiv:2608.06427 [cs.LG] |
| (or arXiv:2608.06427v1 [cs.LG] for this version) | |
| https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.06427
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