arXiv — NLP / Computation & Language · · 3 min read

Does AI Reviewer See the Full Picture? Attacking and Defending Multimodal Peer Review

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Computer Science > Computation and Language

arXiv:2606.12716 (cs)
[Submitted on 10 Jun 2026]

Title:Does AI Reviewer See the Full Picture? Attacking and Defending Multimodal Peer Review

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Abstract:The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) and Multimodal LLMs (MLLMs) into scientific peer-review workflows introduces novel and significant risks for adversarial manipulation, especially given the multimodal nature of scientific papers where figures, not just text, convey core evidence. This creates a significant gap: current robustness studies on AI peer-review are overwhelmingly text-only. Moreover, the problem is distinct from standard jailbreaking, as a peer-review attack seeks to induce a domain-specific, targeted failure (e.g., "inflate this score") rather than a general safety policy violation, for which no practical defenses exist. To address this, we introduce PaperGuard, the first comprehensive benchmark designed to systematically evaluate and defend AI-generated peer-review against these domain-specific, cross-modal attacks. Our framework is built on three pillars: (1) a new multimodal peer-review dataset spanning multiple scientific domains; (2) a unified suite of attacks, including black-box prompt injections and white-box perturbations, specifically designed to target both text (GCG) and figures (PGD); and (3) a practical defense, motivated by the long-context challenge of academic papers, that uses chunk-based embedding search to efficiently localize and mitigate harmful instructions. Our extensive experiments, conducted across state-of-the-art models, confirm that AI reviewers are pervasively vulnerable. PaperGuard establishes the foundational benchmark, protocols, and actionable defense necessary to pioneer trustworthy, attack-resilient AI-assisted scholarly reviewing.
Comments: Accepted to ICML 2026, Project Page: this https URL
Subjects: Computation and Language (cs.CL)
Cite as: arXiv:2606.12716 [cs.CL]
  (or arXiv:2606.12716v1 [cs.CL] for this version)
  https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.12716
arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

Submission history

From: Xinyu Zhao [view email]
[v1] Wed, 10 Jun 2026 22:06:35 UTC (2,808 KB)
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