arXiv — NLP / Computation & Language · · 3 min read

To See is Not to Learn: Protecting Multimodal Data from Unauthorized Fine-Tuning of Large Vision-Language Model

Mirrored from arXiv — NLP / Computation & Language for archival readability. Support the source by reading on the original site.

Computer Science > Cryptography and Security

arXiv:2605.14291 (cs)
[Submitted on 14 May 2026]

Title:To See is Not to Learn: Protecting Multimodal Data from Unauthorized Fine-Tuning of Large Vision-Language Model

View a PDF of the paper titled To See is Not to Learn: Protecting Multimodal Data from Unauthorized Fine-Tuning of Large Vision-Language Model, by Chengshuai Zhao and 4 other authors
View PDF HTML (experimental)
Abstract:The rapid advancement of Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) is increasingly accompanied by unauthorized scraping and training on multimodal web data, posing severe copyright and privacy risks to data owners. Existing countermeasures, such as machine unlearning and watermarks, are inherent post-hoc approaches that act only after intellectual property infringement has already occurred. In this work, we propose MMGuard to empower data owners to proactively protect their multimodal data against unauthorized LVLM fine-tuning. MMGuard generates unlearnable examples by injecting human-imperceptible perturbations that actively exploit the learning dynamics of LVLMs. By minimizing the training loss, the perturbation creates an optimization shortcut, causing the model to overfit to the noise and thereby degrading downstream performance when the perturbation is absent during inference. To further strengthen this defense, MMGuard introduces a cross-modal binding disruption, strategically shifting LVLM attention to enforce a spurious correlation between the noise and the training target with theoretical guarantees. Enhanced by an ensemble learning strategy for cross-model transferability, MMGuard is evaluated against nine open-source LVLMs across six datasets. Our comprehensive results demonstrate effective, stealthy, and robust protection under white-box, gray-box, and black-box threat models, establishing a mechanistic advantage in proactively defending against aggressive fine-tuning exploitation.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computation and Language (cs.CL); Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (cs.CV); Machine Learning (cs.LG)
Cite as: arXiv:2605.14291 [cs.CR]
  (or arXiv:2605.14291v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
  https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.14291
arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

Submission history

From: Chengshuai Zhao [view email]
[v1] Thu, 14 May 2026 02:49:27 UTC (21,443 KB)
Full-text links:

Access Paper:

    View a PDF of the paper titled To See is Not to Learn: Protecting Multimodal Data from Unauthorized Fine-Tuning of Large Vision-Language Model, by Chengshuai Zhao and 4 other authors
  • View PDF
  • HTML (experimental)
  • TeX Source

Current browse context:

cs.CR
< prev   |   next >
Change to browse by:

References & Citations

Loading...

BibTeX formatted citation

loading...
Data provided by:

Bookmark

BibSonomy Reddit
Bibliographic Tools

Bibliographic and Citation Tools

Bibliographic Explorer Toggle
Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?)
Connected Papers Toggle
Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?)
Litmaps Toggle
Litmaps (What is Litmaps?)
scite.ai Toggle
scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?)
Code, Data, Media

Code, Data and Media Associated with this Article

alphaXiv Toggle
alphaXiv (What is alphaXiv?)
Links to Code Toggle
CatalyzeX Code Finder for Papers (What is CatalyzeX?)
DagsHub Toggle
DagsHub (What is DagsHub?)
GotitPub Toggle
Gotit.pub (What is GotitPub?)
Huggingface Toggle
Hugging Face (What is Huggingface?)
ScienceCast Toggle
ScienceCast (What is ScienceCast?)
Demos

Demos

Replicate Toggle
Replicate (What is Replicate?)
Spaces Toggle
Hugging Face Spaces (What is Spaces?)
Spaces Toggle
TXYZ.AI (What is TXYZ.AI?)
Related Papers

Recommenders and Search Tools

Link to Influence Flower
Influence Flower (What are Influence Flowers?)
Core recommender toggle
CORE Recommender (What is CORE?)
About arXivLabs

arXivLabs: experimental projects with community collaborators

arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website.

Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them.

Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs.

Discussion (0)

Sign in to join the discussion. Free account, 30 seconds — email code or GitHub.

Sign in →

No comments yet. Sign in and be the first to say something.

More from arXiv — NLP / Computation & Language